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ABSTRACT 
Vaccine hesitancy, resulting from bad information, threatens the possibility of ending the 
COVID-19 pandemic through mass vaccination. The COVID-19 pandemic coincides with an 
overabundance of controversial information regarding disease transmission and public health 
mitigation approaches. We investigate a phenomenological co-evolution of pandemic and 
infodemic in the context of COVID-19 with an emphasis on evolutionary game theory. Using 
bifurcation analysis, we determine the limit cycle boundaries and the separation of attraction 
between stable foci of infection and periodic outbreaks of infection. Our results suggest that low 
risk perception of vaccination relative to infection is not sufficient to eradicate the disease; 
promotion of quarantine methods or targeted mitigation of the spread of corona-misinformation 
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1 INTRODUCTION  
The COVID-19 pandemic, caused by SARS-CoV-2, presents an unprecedented challenge to 
human health, the economy, and nearly all aspects of our society. COVID-19 vaccination and 
practicing of CDC guidelines is the only sustainable mitigation to prevent widespread morbidity 
and mortality from the infection. Vaccine hesitancy, a strong unwillingness to adopt the 
vaccination independent of morbidity and perceived risk [24, 29], remains a barrier to the 
achievement of herd immunity. It is difficult to comprehend that some of the greatest triumphs of 
medical science are being eroded by the promotion corona-misinformation and corona-distrust 
[26]. In February 2020, the World Health Organization (WHO) started using the term infodemic 
for the overabundance and spread of good and bad information about disease transmission and 
public health mitigation approaches. The spread of corona-misinformation makes it difficult for 
people to ascertain trustworthy sources and reliable guidance when they need it [37]. The WHO, 
the United Nations (UN) UNICEF, and other major world health organizations issued a joint 
statement in September 2020 calling for member states to “manage the COVID-19 infodemic, to 
promote healthy behaviors and mitigate the harm from corona-misinformation and corona-
disinformation [40]. To address vaccine hesitancy and the role of infodemic in driving the 
COVID-19 pandemic, we consider a novel model to understanding the dynamics of the co-
evolution of epidemics and infodemics with vaccination considered. An infodemic requires an 
overabundance of information, communication between news outlets and readers and spreads 
like an epidemic among humans through digital and physical outlets. We choose to model the 
spread of information like the spread of infection, using simple non-linear reaction 
approximations for the rate of information exchange. We incorporate an evolutionary game 
theoretical framework to evaluate the role of risk of infection to an extended COVID-19 
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infodemic model to help understand how the spread of good and bad information impact disease 
transmission. Vaccine hesitancy remains a barrier to population inoculation against highly 
infectious diseases such as SARS-CoV-2. As mass COVID-19 vaccination efforts underway 
around the world, significant vaccine hesitancy, and resistance observed by healthcare workers 
[15, 22] and ethnic minority groups continues to rise [28, 31]. Concerns about the safety of the 
vaccine contribute to vaccine hesitancy. Distrust in the scientific expertise and health and 
government authorities drives consumers away from traditional sources (newspapers, television, 
radio, government agencies) to social media outlets [28], who are then more likely recipients of 
bad information. Recent new studies have begun to classify and quantify the spread of bad 
information about COVID-19 [32, 33]. A study, based on a national survey of US adults in 
March and July of 2020, found that about 15% believed the pharmaceutical industry created the 
coronavirus and more than 28% thought it was a bioweapon made by the Chinese government. 
Those beliefs predicated a subsequent decrease in willingness to wear a mask or take a vaccine 
[32]. An analysis of bad information from five countries (the United States, the UK, Ireland, 
Spain, and Mexico showed that substantial portions of each population - anywhere from 15% to 
37% - believed bad information about COVID-19 in April and May 2020, representing what the 
authors call a “major threat to public health.” People who are more gullible to corona-
misinformation are less likely to comply with public health recommendations and less likely to 
become vaccinated [33]. Most studies on the spread of information focus on the contribution of 
social media platforms such as Facebook, Twitter, and WhatsApp act as functional conduits in 
the surge of bad information [2, 12, 27, 42]. These models suggest that the transmission of 
corona-misinformation, is a palpable risk to society; facilitating public distrust and impeding the 
CDC advised practices including mask wearing, social distancing, and quarantining following 
Co-evolution of Pandemic and Infodemic                                                                                     3 
infection. Preceding the COVID-19 pandemic, one study used an agent-based model of a 
norovirus outbreak to show that reducing bad information by 30% or making at least 30% of the 
population fully resistant to sharing bad information, was effective in counteracting the negative 
impacts of bad advice on the outbreak [7]. Another study, using a susceptible-infectious-
susceptible (SIS) epidemic model on a scale free network incorporated media mitigated 
reduction in infection and showed that the spread of good information can impede infection by 
decreasing the basic reproductive number [39]. Additionally, both models considered the spread 
of infection as influenced by the spread of information yet lacked the feedback of infection on 
the spread of information. One more study used a susceptible-exposed-infectious-recovered 
(SEIR) model on a bipartite network (a physical social network for epidemics and a separate 
information spread network for social influence) coupled with risk perception of infection to 
information in the onset of epidemic [41]. Their results suggest that although heavy non-
pharmaceutical intervention greatly reduces the epidemic spread, high socioeconomic cost 
associated with these interventions will prevent their implementation [41]. None of these 
previous network models included vaccination [7, 39, 41]. We propose a mathematical model 
that couples epidemiology with evolutionary game theory to help understand the co-evolution of 
epidemic and infodemic in the presence of vaccination. We use a stratified SIS model for viral 
infection, accounting for the possibility of reinfection through the emergence of different viral 
variants. We stratify the population to those with ’good’ and ’bad’ information. People with 
’good’ information follow science-based advice, practice precautionary measures issued by CDC 
including following guidelines on wearing mask, keeping social distance, and becoming 
vaccinated when possible. People with ’bad’ information behave contrarily and propagate the 
spread of disease. We model the spread of information using a similar framework as models for 
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the spread of infections, people with ’good’ information are misinformed by the ’bad’ and 
change their behavior accordingly. Furthermore, we consider the probability of ’good’ becoming 
vaccinated, which depends upon the perception of risk of vaccination relative to infection and is 
derived using an evolutionary game theoretical framework. Our co-evolution model of pandemic 
and infodemic exhibits complex dynamics stable foci of high infection at high rates of bad 
information spread (Figures: 2.6.1, 2.6.2, 2.6.3), stable periodic oscillations of infection at low 
rates of good information spread (Figures: 2.9.1, 2.9.2), and mixed oscillations at high values of 
risk perception (Figure 2.7.1). We find that the spread of bad information feeds the infectious 
disease spread, allowing periodic outbreaks even for 90% vaccination efficacy in reducing the 
infection. Although reducing the perception of risk of vaccination increases the vaccination 
uptake, promotion of good information or reduction of bad information drives the system to 
disease free state. Our results suggest that increasing the trust of the public, e.g., reducing the 
risk perception of the vaccination, is not sufficient in the achievement of herd immunity; 
additional mitigation methods that focus on the spread of information are needed to promote the 
health of the population. 
1.1 Background 
Previous models have considered the reduction of infection that depends on media 
coverage [39], the mitigation of disease in contrast to socioeconomic cost [41], and the 
incorporation of relative vaccination morbidity relative to infection mortality [7]. One model 
considered a degree distribution of infection and performed static analysis on the basic 
reproductive number. Suppose there are S = {N1, N2, …, Nn} distinct nodes of degree Nj. The 
degree distribution, Pj, can be expressed as the relative fraction of each degree node divided by 
the cumulative sum: 
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𝑁𝑗
𝑁1 + 𝑁2 + ⋯ + 𝑁𝑛
                                                                                                                                   (1.1) 
The first moment of the degree distribution, or commonly referred to as the mean degree, is 
expressed as: 
⟨𝑘⟩ = 𝑘𝑗𝑃𝑗                                                                                                                                                    (1.2) 
In the classical SIS model, one considers the following set of two equations: 
𝑑𝑆
𝑑𝑡
=  −𝛽∗𝑆𝐼 + 𝜇𝐼                                                                                                                                     (1.3) 
𝑑𝐼
𝑑𝑡
= 𝛽∗𝑆𝐼 − 𝜇𝐼                                                                                                                                          (1.4) 
Where β* is the effective transmissibility of infection and µ is the disease recovery rate. In a 
heterogeneous model, the probability of running into the susceptible depends on the degree 







                                                                                                                                         (1.5) 
Where <k> is the mean degree (1.2), Nk = Sk + Ik, and Pk is the degree distribution (1.1). 
Substitution of density function (1.5) into equations (1.1, 1.2), gives the following: 
𝑑𝑆
𝑑𝑡
=  −𝛽Θ 𝑆𝑘 + 𝜇𝐼𝑘                                                                                                                                 (1.6) 
𝑑𝐼
𝑑𝑡
=  𝛽𝛩 𝑆𝑘 − 𝜇𝐼𝑘                                                                                                                                    (1.7) 
Yi Wang considers the infectious dynamics of binge drinking: taking Sk as the susceptible 
fraction with no or moderate drinking habits, Xk as the aware fraction that avoids encountering 
the binge drinking fraction of population Ik. Substituting the effective probability of infection, β* 
= βꝊ, one has the following: 
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𝑑𝑆𝑘
𝑑𝑡
= −𝛽Θ𝑆𝑘 + 𝜇𝐼𝑘 − 𝛼𝑆𝑘𝑀 − 𝜎𝑋𝑘                                                                                                   (1.8) 
𝑑𝑋𝑘
𝑑𝑡
= 𝛼𝑆𝑘𝑀 − 𝜎𝑋𝑘                                                                                                                                 (1.9) 
𝑑𝐼𝑘
𝑑𝑡
= 𝛽𝑆𝑘Θ − 𝜇𝐼𝑘                                                                                                                                  (1.10) 
𝑑𝑀
𝑑𝑡
= 𝜔Σ(𝐼𝑘) − 𝛾𝑀                                                                                                                               (1.11) 
Where M is the media of awareness of infection and serves as the good information that reduces 
the severity of the epidemic, µ is the recovery rate of the binge drinkers, α is the dissemination 
rate of awareness among non/moderate drinkers, ω is the growth rate of media coverage, γ is the 
depletion of media coverage due to ineffective measures, and σ is the transmission rate from 
aware individuals to non/moderate drinkers [37]. In this manuscript, we consider the good 
information to promote quarantine methods following infection. 
Another model considers a bipartite network G = (V, Ei, Ec(t)) that incorporates information 
exchange and disease spread concomitantly where V = {V1, V2, …, Vn} is the collection of n 
individuals and Ei and Ec(t) correspond to the influence and contact layer respectively. In Ye’s 
analysis, the influence layer is static and does not evolve in time. In the disease domain, each 
element, i, takes on a health status of healthy at xi or infected at yi. Taking Ak = {Sk, Ik} to 
consist of all individuals of with degree k, Ye chooses to model the infectious dynamics using an 
SIR approach. Let R = N – S - I be the removed fraction of the population  Under the assumption 
of no vital dynamics, the transmission of infection can be described as: 
𝑑𝑆𝑘
𝑑𝑡
= −𝜆Θ𝑆𝑘                                                                                                                                          (1.12) 
𝑑𝐼𝑘
𝑑𝑡
= 𝜆Θ𝑆𝑘 − 𝜇𝐼𝑘                                                                                                                                   (1.13) 
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𝑑𝑅
𝑑𝑡
= 𝜇Σ𝐼𝑘                                                                                                                                                (1.14) 
Ye takes a unique modelling approach and considers non-linear modelling of policy decision 
making, risk perception function, and associated cost of self-protective behavior. Their paper 
considers the payoff function to depend on policy decision and risk perception and is formulated 
using network coordination type games [41]. In this manuscript, we consider the homogeneous 
model that focuses on the risk payoff which does not depend on policy decision nor degree 















Co-evolution of Pandemic and Infodemic                                                                                     8 
2 RESULTS 
2.1 A Mathematical Model for the Coevolution of Epidemic and Infodemic 
We consider a stratified SIS model for both virus and information spread to model the co-
evolution of epidemic and infodemic. In the disease domain, the population is divided into 
susceptible (S), infectious (I), and vaccinated (V). In the information domain, the population 
consists of two mutually exclusive compartments: those with good information practice behavior 
restrictive public health measures to reduce spread of disease; including mask wearing, social 
distancing, and a likelihood of receiving vaccination. Likewise, those with bad information 
contribute to the spread of infection and bad information. We model the spread of information 
analogous to an infectious process requiring physical contact between good and bad fractions in 
the information domain. Additionally, we make a strong assumption that those infected with 
good information (IG) follow CDC guidelines and practice self-quarantine. Therefore, only the 
infected people with bad information (IB) transmit the virus and drive the epidemic spread. 
Throughout this manuscript, we evaluate the phenomenological role of perception of risk of 
vaccination, rates of spread of good and bad information that drive the complex dynamics 
between pandemic and infodemic. We find that decreasing the perception of risk of vaccination, 
promoting the spread of good information, and reducing the spread of bad information promotes 
the achievement of herd immunity. As illustrated in the schematic diagram (Figure 2.1.1), a 
susceptible person with good information (SG) is exposed to the force of infection by IB to 
become infected with good behavior (IG) or are recipients of bad information and become (SB). A 
bad behaving infected person (IB) can recover from the disease and become a susceptible person 
with bad behaviors SB at rate γ or be ’educated’ at rate ϵ to become IG. We assume that the 
transmission of good information of those infected with bad information is proportional to the 
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contact to good information. The susceptible with good information SG become vaccinated with 
probability φ. Vaccinated people are temporarily immune with efficacy δ. The vaccination 
compartment serves as a vaccination leakage for δ < 1. 
 
Figure 2.1.1 Schematic representation of co-evolution of infodemic and pandemic. The 
susceptible population with good information, SG, is infected with corona-misinformation and 
virus at transmission probabilities: µ and χ respectively. The susceptible with bad information SB 
have an increased force of infection χ < ?̂?.  Once a susceptible becomes infected, they recover at 
rate γ. Additionally, the misinformed infectious IB become educated at rate ϵ. The probability 
that a susceptible person with good information, SG, becomes vaccinated with probability φ. The 
vaccination compartment acts as a leakage and become re-infected.  
 
In the absence of vital dynamics, conservation implies: SG + SB + IG + IB + V = 1. Throughout 
this manuscript, we use the following composite quantities: Bad (B = IB + SB), Good (G = IG + 
SG), Infected (I = IG + IB), and Healthy (H = SG + SB + V). In the disease domain (the horizontal 
directions of Figure 2.1.1), we assume that both infected populations: IG and IB, recover at rate γ, 
but bad-behaving susceptible, SB, are infected at a higher rate than that for good-behaving 
susceptible (χ < ?̂?). In the information domain (the vertical direction of Figure 2.1.1), we assume 
SG is misinformed by those with the bad information, B, at transmission probability µ; those 
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infected with bad information, IB, are educated through exposure to those with good information, 
G, at transmission probability ϵ. We further assume that the probability of vaccination uptake 
depends on the relative perception risk of vaccination relative to infection, r. We use game 
theoretical framework to model the human decision-making on vaccination [6]. In a traditional 
vaccination game, the payoff of an individual taking a vaccine is greater when the morbidity risk 
is lower. In the context of COVID-19, the vaccination hesitancy is not due to vaccination 
morbidity but may depend on risk perception of vaccination relative to infection [28, 31]. We use 
rv and ri to denote the perceived risks of vaccination and infection, respectively, and define the 
relative risk perception as r = rv/ri. The probability of vaccination φ depends on the strength of 
initiative parameter, m, and payoff gained for adopting the vaccination strategy compared with 
individuals who do not take the vaccination [6, 21]. The strength of initiative is a proportionality 
constant that determines the speed of convergence at which those with the susceptible population 
with the good information become vaccinated, which we assume to be constant (Section 2.3). 




= 𝛾𝐼𝐺 − 𝜙𝑆𝐺 − 𝜒𝑆𝐺𝐼𝐵 − 𝜇𝑆𝐺(𝐼𝐵 + 𝑆𝐵)                                                                                   (2.1.1) 
𝑑𝑆𝐵
𝑑𝑡
= 𝛾𝐼𝐵 + 𝜇𝑆𝐺(𝑆𝐵 + 𝐼𝐵) −  ?̂?𝑆𝐵𝐼𝐵                                                                                                (2.1.2) 
𝑑𝐼𝐺
𝑑𝑡
= −𝛾𝐼𝐺 + 𝜖(𝑆𝐺 + 𝐼𝐺)𝐼𝐵 + 𝜒𝑆𝐺𝐼𝐵                                                                                               (2.1.3) 
𝑑𝐼𝐵
𝑑𝑡
= −𝛾𝐼𝐵 +  ?̂?𝑆𝐵𝐼𝐵 − 𝜖(𝑆𝐺 + 𝐼𝐺)𝐼𝐵 + (1 − 𝛿)𝜒𝑉 𝐼𝐵                                                                (2.1.4) 
𝑑𝑉
𝑑𝑡
= 𝜙𝑆𝐺 − (1 − 𝛿)𝜒𝑉𝐼𝐵                                                                                                                   (2.1.5) 
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𝑑𝜙
𝑑𝑡
= 𝑚𝜙(1 − 𝜙)(𝐼𝐺 + 𝐼𝐵 − 𝑟𝑉)                                                                                                      (2.1.6) 
In these equations, the transmission rates of “bad” information spread, and “good” information 
spread are µ and ϵ, respectively, which we refer to as corona-misinformation and education. 
Although information spreads faster than virus transmission in the digital landscape [41], the rate 
for a person to change their opinion upon receiving information varies greatly. Hence, in our 
mean-field model, without the separation of information and physical networks, the rate of 
information transmission (for µ and ϵ) can be greater or less than those for viral infection. 
Without loss of generality, we assume the spread of corona-misinformation is less than infection 
(µ < ?̂?), and the rate for education exceeds the intrinsic disease recovery rate (ϵ > γ) (Table 
2.1.1). 
Table 2.1.1 Model parameters and their baseline values. All parameters are unitless, 
except for γ with unit 1/ day. Note that: γ, χ, χ ̂ and m are kept constant in the simulations 
reported below. 
 
In this set of baseline parameters, we choose γ = 0.07 to reflect the 14-day incubation period, and 
?̂? = 0.37 such that R0 = 2.5, consistent with the epidemiology of SARS-CoV-2.  
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To measure the prevalence of infection, we derive the effective reproductive number using the 
next generation matrix technique [14, 15]. When no vaccine is available, φ = 0 = V. Solving for 
the non-trivial fixed point in equation (2.1.4) leads to:  
?̂?𝑆𝐵 − 𝛾 − 𝜖𝐺 = ( 
?̂?𝑆𝐵
𝛾 + 𝜖𝐺
− 1) = 0                                                                                                 (2.1.7) 
where G = SG + IG is the fraction of the population with good information. For IB ≠ 0, IG = IB 




− 1) = 𝐼𝐵(𝑅0 − 1) = 0                                                                                                  (2.1.8) 
Thus, the effective reproductive number only depends on the infection force generated with the 
bad information IB. With non-trivial probability of vaccination uptake, φ ∈ (0, 1), we have: 
𝐼𝐵 (
?̂?𝑆𝐵 + (1 − 𝛿)𝜒𝑉
𝛾 + 𝜖𝐺
− 1)                                                                                                                (2.1.9) 
When the term within the parenthesis in equation (2.1.9) is negative for all time t ≥ 0, IB will 
converge to 0 and the system reaches a disease-free equilibrium (DFE). Thus, we have the 
effective reproductive number:  
𝑅𝑒 =  
?̂?𝑆𝐵 + (1 − 𝛿)𝜒𝑉
𝛾 + 𝜖𝐺
                                                                                                                    (2.1.10) 
Note that when V = 0 or δ = 1, Re reduces to R0 in equation (2.1.8). We observe that the 
effective reproductive number inversely depends on the recovery rate: γ and the spread of good 
information: ϵG. Re decreases with increasing vaccination efficacy: δ and increases with 
probability of disease transmissibility between the bad at rate: ?̂?. We note that the appearance of 
the V term in the numerator of the effective reproductive number, Re, is a consequence of the 
assumption of vaccination leakage where the vaccinated are re-infected by those with the bad 
information. Unique to our model, the inclusion of high infection on SB by IB at transmission 
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probability ?̂? is two orders of magnitude higher than the infection generated on V by IB at rate (1 
− δ) χ. For appropriate choices of the parameters, we obtain mixed oscillations and is reflected in 
the separation of time scales in the numerator of Re (Figure 2.5.1). 
2.2 Model Formulation  
2.2.1 Model 
We consider a stratified SIS framework partitioned into binary: good (SG, IG) vs. bad (SB, 
IB) respectively. Furthermore, we assume that the susceptible individuals with good information, 
SG, take the vaccine, V, which depends on the risk function φ. 
𝑑𝑆𝐺
𝑑𝑡
= 𝛾𝐼𝐺 − (𝜆?̃? + 𝜆𝑏 + 𝜙)𝑆𝐺                                                                                                          (2.2.1) 
𝑑𝑆𝐵
𝑑𝑡
= 𝛾𝐼𝐵 + 𝜆?̃?𝑆𝐺 − 𝜆𝑔𝑆𝐵                                                                                                                 (2.2.2) 
𝑑𝐼𝐺
𝑑𝑡
= −𝛾𝐼𝐺 + 𝛼𝑔𝐼𝐵 + 𝑣?̃?𝐺                                                                                                                  (2.2.3) 
𝑑𝐼𝐵
𝑑𝑡
=  −𝛾𝐼𝐺 + ?̂?𝑏𝐼𝐵 −  𝑣?̃?𝐺 + (1 − 𝛿)𝛼𝑣𝐼𝐵                                                                                   (2.2.4) 
𝑑𝑉
𝑑𝑡
= 𝜙𝑆𝐺 − (1 − 𝛿)𝛼𝑣𝐼𝐵                                                                                                                    (2.2.5) 
𝑑𝜙
𝑑𝑡
= 𝑚𝜙(1 − 𝜙)(𝐼 − 𝑟𝑉)                                                                                                                  (2.2.6) 
In these equations: 
𝐼 = 𝐼𝐺 + 𝐼𝐵                                                                                                                                               (2.2.7) 
𝐵 = 𝑆𝐵 + 𝐼𝐵                                                                                                                                            (2.2.8) 
𝐺 = 𝑆𝐺 + 𝐼𝐺                                                                                                                                              (2.2.9) 
𝛼𝑔 = 𝑐𝑏𝑔𝛽𝑏𝑔𝑆𝐺 = 𝜒𝑆𝐺                                                                                                                       (2.2.10) 
𝛼𝑣 = 𝑐𝑏𝑔𝛽𝑏𝑔𝑉 = 𝜒𝑉                                                                                                                           (2.2.11) 
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?̂?𝑏 = 𝑐𝑏𝑔𝛽𝑏𝑔𝑆𝐵 =  ?̂?𝑆𝐵                                                                                                                      (2.2.12) 
𝑣?̃? = 𝑐𝑏𝑔𝛽?̃? 𝑆𝐺 = 𝜇𝑆𝐺                                                                                                                         (2.2.13) 
𝑣?̃? = 𝑐𝑔𝛽?̃?𝐼𝐵 = 𝜖𝐼𝐵                                                                                                                              (2.2.14) 
2.2.2 Nullclines 
Consider the state variable vector, x = [x1, x2, x3, x4, x5], and the vector function fj(x) for 
each j = 1, 2, . . ., 5, then equations (2.1.1, 2.1.2, 2.1.4, 2.1.5, 2.1.6) can be expressed as:  
𝑑𝑥1
𝑑𝑡
= 𝑓1(𝑥)                                                                                                                                          (2.2.16) 
𝑑𝑥2
𝑑𝑡
= 𝑓2(𝑥)                                                                                                                                          (2.2.17) 
𝑑𝑥3
𝑑𝑡
= 𝑓3(𝑥)                                                                                                                                          (2.2.18) 
𝑑𝑥4
𝑑𝑡
= 𝑓4(𝑥)                                                                                                                                          (2.2.19) 
𝑑𝑥5
𝑑𝑡
= 𝑓5(𝑥)                                                                                                                                          (2.2.20) 
The nullclines and phase portraits for two distinct of the state variables are obtained by setting all 
equations to the right-hand side of equations (2.1.1, 2.1.2, 2.1.4, 2.1.5, 2.1.6) equal to zero. 
Without loss of generality, let Nxi and Nxj represent the nullclines in xi and xj respectively. The 
xi nullcline, Nxi, is obtained by setting dxi / dt equal to zero and solving for xj. The xj nullcline, 
Nxj, is obtained by setting dxj / dt equal to zero and solving for xi. In our model, the SB vs. SG 




                                                                                                                            (2.2.21) 
𝑁𝑆𝐺 =
𝛾𝐼𝐺 − 𝑆𝐺(𝜙
∗ + (𝜒 + 𝜇)𝐼𝐵
∗ )
𝜇𝑆𝐺
                                                                                                  (2.2.22) 
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                                                                                                           (2.2.23)  




∗                                                                                                                   (2.2.24) 












                                                                                                            (2.2.26) 












∗ + 𝐼𝐺 + 𝜒𝑆𝐺
∗ )
                                                                                                                   (2.2.28) 
Where SG*, SB*, IB*, V*, φ*, and IG* = 1 – (SG* + SB* + IB* + V*) represent the fixed points 
obtained numerically using PyDSTool [11].  
2.2.3 Perturbation about Steady States 
After obtaining the steady state values by setting equations (2.1.1 – 2.1.6) equal to zero 
and solving numerically for the steady state vector x∗ using PyDSTool [11]. We obtain a 
perturbed time series plot for the fixed points; we apply the following algorithm to determine the 
perturbation about the time series data: 
1. Obtain a steady state vector, x∗, using PyDSTool [11].  
2. Generate a uniformly distributed random variable: u = [u1, u2, . . ., u5].  
3. Loop through each component of the steady state vector: xj* in each j = 1, 2, . . ., 5. 
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 4. Set: zj = (1 + ϵ0 × σj × uj) × xj*, where zj is the jth component of perturbed steady state 
vector z, σj = sgn(uj − 1/2) takes value of 1 or −1, and ϵ0 is the weight of the noise. 
Throughout the simulation ϵ0 ∈ (0, 0.1).  
5. Exit the loop and use z∗ for the new initial conditions. 
2.2.4 Calculation of the Jacobian  
The Jacobian of the system is computed by taking the first partials of equations (2.1.1 - 
2.1.6). Without loss of generality, not considering equation (2.1.3), since conservation implies: 
SG + SB + IG + IB +V = 1, gives rise to linear dependency. The (i, j)th element of the Jacobian is 
the partial derivative of the ith equation with respect to the jth state variable of the state vector: 
x* = [SG*, SB*, IB*, V*, φ*]. One obtains: 
J11 = −γ − [φ∗ + (χ + µ)IB* + µSB*], J12 = −γ − µSG*, J13 = −γ − (χ + µ)SG*, J14 = −γ, J15 = −SG*, 
J21 = µ(SB* + IB*), J22 = µSG* − ?̂?IB*, J23 = µSG* + γ − ?̂?SB*, J24 = 0, J25 = 0, J31 = 0, J32 = (?̂? + 
ϵ)IB*, J33 = ?̂?SB* + (1 − δ)χV* − γ + ϵ(SB* + 2IB* + V∗ − 1), J34 = [(1 − δ)χ + ϵ]IB*, J35 = 0 J41 = 
φ∗ , J42 = 0, J43 = −(1 − δ)χV∗ , J44 = −(1 − δ)χIB*, J45 = SG*, J51 = −mφ∗ (1 − φ∗), J52 = −mφ∗ (1 
− φ∗), J53 = 0, J54 = −φ∗ (1 − φ∗)(1 + r), J55 = (1 − 2φ∗)[1 − (SG* + SB* + (1 + r)V∗)]  
Where: Jij = ∂xi / ∂xj and: SG*, SB*, IB*, V∗, and φ∗ represent the fixed points obtained 
numerically using PyDSTool [11]. A close observation of the 5th column shows that the 
branching point bifurcation in Figure 2.7.1 is obtained for SG = 0, φ = 1, ∆E = 0 giving rise to an 
identical zero eigenvalue, which corresponds to the unstable mixed Nash Equilibrium in the 
coordination game (Section 2.3 and [20]). 
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2.3 Game Theoretical Formulation of Vaccination  
2.3.1 Deriving the Risk Function 
The simplest formation of a vaccination game consists of two players: The vaccinated 
(V) and defector (D), whom each have a finite set of choices πV and πD respectively. For 
simplicity, we consider the defector (D), to take a chance to become infected (I). We consider the 
following payoff matrix: π is 2 x 2 matrix whose (v, w)th entry is the payoff of the vth player in 
response to the wth player. In the vaccination game, one obtains:  πvv = 0, πvi = -ri I, πiv = -rv V, 
and πii = 0 [6]. Where rv and ri are the risk perception associated to vaccination and infection 
respectively. For simplicity, we consider payoffs with the vaccinated and infected interact with 
each other (leaving the diagonal entries 0). Consider xv and xi the frequency of strategy selection 
of vaccination and defection, i.e., infection, respectively. Since our game only considers the 




= 𝑥𝑗(𝜋𝑥)𝑗 − 𝑥
′𝜋𝑥                                                                                                                       (2.3.1) 
For each j = v, i. Since xv + xi = 1, then we can simplify the coupled replicator equations into:  
𝑑𝑥
𝑑𝑡
= 𝑥𝑣 × (1 − 𝑥𝑣) × [(𝜋𝑥)𝑣 − (𝜋𝑥)𝑖]                                                                                       (2.3.2) 
Where (πx)v − (πx)i = ∆E is the marginal expectation difference between the strategies [20]. 
According to the Bishop-Canning’s Theorem, one can compute the marginal expectation 
difference provided there exists a non-trivial Nash equilibrium. Since our payoff matrix π in 
equation 2.3.2 follows a coordination game where the greatest payoffs are located along the main 
diagonal, then we can compute the pure Nash equilibrium, which are determined by the relative 
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difference in the diagonal elements [18, 20, 38]. Applying the Bishop-Cannings theorem in [20, 




                                                                                                                                     (2.3.3) 
Where πvi and πiv are the expected payoffs in payoff matrix π. The marginal expectation 
difference follows is:  
Δ𝐸 = 𝑥𝐸[𝑣] − (1 − 𝑥)𝐸[𝑖] =  −𝑟𝑣𝑉 + 𝑟𝑖𝐼                                                                           (2.3.4) 
Since scaling the payoff matrix in 2.1 does not change the behavior of the game [6, 18], then the 
marginal expectation difference can be expressed as: ∆E = I − r × V = 1 + (1 + r) V − SG − SB, 
where r = rv / ri is the dimensionless relative risk perception of vaccination to infection. Thus, the 
replicator equation that describes the adoption of becoming vaccinated is simply:  
𝑑𝑥
𝑑𝑡
= 𝑥(1 − 𝑥)Δ𝐸                                                                                                                               (2.3.5) 
And simplifies to equation 2.1.6 when substituting x = φ and multiplying by the strength of 
initiative parameter m. 
2.3.2 Computing the Nash Equilibrium 
Since the payoff matrix in has diagonal elements identically equal to zero, then we can 
compute the Nash equilibrium. Consider φv ∈ (0, 1) the non-trivial probability of vaccination 
uptake. Observe that the replicator equation in equations (2.1.6, 2.3.5) exhibits the following 
dynamics: 
Table 2.3.1 Marginal expectation difference ∆E in equation 2.1.6 with respect to risk 
perception of vaccination relative to infection, r, fraction of vaccinated V, and fraction of 
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infected I. The parameter range for the incentive to vaccinate is greater at higher levels of 
infection as compared to vaccination. 
 
For any given time, t, when the vaccinated, V, is smaller than or equal to the fraction infected, I, 
the sensitivity about the perception of risk has a larger range for positive incentive to vaccinate 
∆E ≥ 0 when r ∈ (0, r∗) and r∗ > 1 (Table 2.3.1: column 2). This suggests that in the early stages 
of the epidemic, the perception of risk is less sensitive to increasing the fraction of the population 
to become infected. The value of risk, r, that drives the risk function to an unstable equilibrium in 
equation 2.1.6 corresponds to the emergence of stable oscillations in the branching point 
bifurcation (Figure 2.7.1). The oscillations in φ are also a reflection of the mixed unstable Nash 
equilibrium in the coordination game [20]. During the later stages of the pandemic, the fraction 
of infected begin to decrease as the population begins to take the vaccine. For any given time, t, 
when the vaccinated exceeds the cumulative infected and the incentive to vaccinate only exists 
for r ∈ (0, r∗) where r∗ < 1 (Table 2.3.1: column 3). The value of r∗ that corresponds to the 
incentive to vaccinate identically equal to zero, ∆E = 0, corresponding to the emergence of limit 
cycles along the branching point bifurcation (Figures: 2.6.1, 2.7.1). 
2.4 Local Sensitivity Analyses 
We perform local sensitivity analysis (LSA) about the baseline parameters in Table 2.1.1. 
The goal of local sensitivity analysis is to evaluate the outputs of the model (QOI’s) with respect 
to key parameters of interest (POI’s). The most sensitive parameters have the most potent effects 
with respect to small deviations from an initial value [4]. If ?̂? and ?̂? are estimated parameter and 
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quantities of interest respectively, and ?̂? = Q (?̂?). Then, we can perturb the parameter of interest 










                                                                                                                        (2.4.1) 
Where θp is the x% perturbation about the parameter of interest, p, and θq is the response to the 
perturbation. Hence, θq = x% × S (p, q) will determine the percentage change of quantity of 
interest when parameter of interest p changes by x%. 
Table 2.4.1 Local Sensitivity Indices S (p, q) with respect to key parameters of interest 
(each column). Each row are the quantities of interest observed in Figure 2.4.1. Each entry 
represents a x% change of the QOI with respect to a 10% change in the POI. For instance, a 
10% increase in leads to a 1.1% decrease in V* yet increases I∗ and G∗ by 0.93% and 0.89% 
respectively. 
 
2.5 Rich Dynamical Patterns for Coevolution of Pandemic and Infodemic 
We observe three predominant patterns for the Co-evolution of Pandemic and Infodemic 
model. One, at intermediate rate of µ = 0.10 and low values of r = 0.34, the system undergoes 
displays low frequency high amplitude of vaccination stable oscillations (Figure 2.5.1 A, D, G). 
Two, at exceptional low values of r = 0.09 and intermediate µ = 0.10, the system transitions to 
stable focus of high infection and vaccination corresponding to co-existence in epidemic and 
vaccination (Figure 2.5.1 B, E, H). Three, at low values of r = 0.374, and high values of µ = 
0.24, the system displays high frequency stable oscillations of low infection (Figure 2.5.2 C, F, 
I). 
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Figure 2.5.1: Three simple dynamics emerge from the co-evolution model. The three 
columns represent the time evolution of state variables, effective reproductive number, and phase 
portraits respectively. A, D, G: The system undergoes mixed oscillations of low amplitude low 
frequency of infection. B, E, H: The system exhibits stable focus of high infection and infection. 
C, F, I: The system undergoes a stable periodic oscillation of low infection (here µ = 0.24). 
Initial conditions about the steady states in Figures 2.7.1, 2.7.2 using the algorithm in section 
2.2.3. 
 
2.6 Infodemic Drives Pandemic: Stopping Infodemic is necessary to stop Epidemic 
To evaluate the spread of bad information in COVID-19, we start along the unstable 
Hopf with r = 1.635 and vary µ as a bifurcation parameter. We observe that increasing the spread 
of bad information increases the infection and, not surprisingly, reduces the good information in 
the population (Figure 2.6.1). We observe the system transitions into stable oscillations of low 
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infection at lower values of µ, while intermediate values of µ lead to unstable mixed oscillations, 
and high values of µ drive the system to stable focus of high infection (Figures: 2.6.1, 2.6.2). 
Notably, at high levels of good information and intermediate values of bad information, the 
system transitions into high frequency oscillations with low peaks of infection (Figure 2.6.3). 
Hence, increasing the spread of good information is a sufficient method of public health 
mitigation policy for reducing the severity of pandemic. It should be noted that our model fails to 
account for the existence of super spreaders of bad information, which may have strong 
contribution of infection spread (Section 3, [41]). 
 
 
Figure 2.6.1: A – B: Time series evolution of the state variables and effective 
reproductive number respectively. C – D: Phase portraits for the respective time series in 
column 1. E – F: Fixed points with respect to µ. blue and red lines represent stable and unstable 
fixed points respectively. BP’s represent branching point bifurcations where the fixed point has 
an identical zero eigenvalue. NS’s represent neutral saddle equilibrium; a saddle node with an 
identical zero normal form coefficient. H’s represent Andronov-Hopf bifurcations with a pair of 
purely imaginary eigenvalues. Initial conditions are set about a perturbation of the branching 
point bifurcation using algorithm 2.2.3. At high r the system displays mixed oscillations and 
decreasing µ drives the system to DFE. 
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Figure 2.6.2: A – B: Time series evolution of the state variables and effective reproductive 
number respectively. C – D: Phase portraits for the respective time series in column 1. E – F: 
Fixed points with respect to µ. blue and red lines represent stable and unstable fixed points 
respectively. NS’s represent neutral saddle equilibrium; a saddle node with an identical zero 
normal form coefficient. H’s represent Andronov-Hopf bifurcations with a pair of purely 
imaginary eigenvalues. Initial conditions are set about a perturbation of the Hopf bifurcation 
using algorithm 2.2.3. At low r the system is unstable for low values of µ. 
 
 
Figure 2.6.3: A – B: Time series evolution of the state variables and effective 
reproductive number respectively. C – D: Phase portraits for the respective time series in 
column 1. E – F: Fixed points with respect to µ, ϵ. Solid and dotted lines represent stable and 
unstable periodic orbits respectively. BPC’s correspond to branching point of cycles 
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corresponding to the intersection between stable focus and unstable periodic orbit. NS’s 
represent neutral saddle equilibrium; a saddle node with an identical zero normal form 
coefficient. NSr’s represent Neimark-Sacker giving birth to a closed invariant curve from a fixed 
point. H’s represent Andronov-Hopf bifurcations with a pair of purely imaginary eigenvalues. 
Initial conditions are set about a perturbation of the Neimark-Sacker bifurcation using algorithm 
2.2.3. The system displays unstable periodic orbits at high values of r and low values of µ. 
 
2.7 High Risk Perception of Infection Promotes Vaccination 
One example of high risk is the disproportional perception of vaccine risk and vaccine 
hesitancy [28]. To determine the effect of vaccine hesitancy and resistance to long term epidemic 
mitigation, we consider the uptake of vaccination: φ to depend on the relative risk of vaccination 
to infection. In the context of COVID-19, r corresponds to the risk perception of infection 
relative to vaccination, although previous models have considered the relative morbidity risk of 
vaccination relative to infection [6]. Our interpretation of risk perception is due to the 
controversy regarding rumors associated to the vaccine throughout its development [15, 30]. 
Mathematically, r corresponds to the dimensionless parameter that determines the probability of 
vaccination uptake, which is determined using game theory (Sections: 2.2 - 2.4). Asymptotically, 
the probability of vaccination, φ, converges to zero provided the incentive to vaccinate ∆E = I − 
rV is positive leading to the transition into stable focus (Figures: 2.7.1, 2.7.2). When the risk, r, 
is identically 0, there is always an incentive to vaccinate for any non-zero φ and non-negative I 
value. Since our theoretical formulation of vaccination follows a coordination game, there exists 
an unstable mixed Nash Equilibria for non-trivial φ [20] for a critical r∗ (Sections: 2.2 - 2.4). The 
critical r∗ corresponds to the emergence of periodic oscillations and the constant changing of 
epidemic selection strategy [20]. Furthermore, the branching point bifurcation with and identical 
zero eigenvalue corresponds to value of φ = 1 concomitant with the identity: ∆E = 0 (Figure 
2.7.1, Section 2.3). We identify at intermediate values of risk; stable periodic oscillations begin 
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to emerge along the branching point and Hopf bifurcations (Figure 2.7.1). The branching point 
indicates a point in the domain where no local neighborhood will converge to a point in the local 
region drifts away towards a region corresponding to the limit cycles [16]. Our results are 
consistent with survey data that suggest that intermediate values of risk perception of vaccination 
may hinder the achievement of herd immunity as indicated by the emergence of stable limit 
cycles and oscillations about Re = 1 (Figures: 2.5.1, 2.5.2) [9, 23, 30]. We observe that 
decreasing the risk perception of vaccination relative to infection decreases infection and 
increases vaccination (Figure 2.7.1). Notably, concomitant decrease in the spread of corona-
misinformation along with reduction of risk perception of vaccination is sufficient to drive the 
system to DFE. At low risk and high spread of bad information, the system transitions to stable 
focus of high infection (Figure 2.7.2). These results may be understood from a game theoretical 
perspective by analyzing the risk function (equation 2.1.6, Section 2.3). The intersection of the 
stable focus boundary (in red) and limit cycle continuation (in blue) corresponds to the 
emergence of the branching point bifurcation (BP), which phenomenologically separates the 
stable focus of infection from the persistent low frequency stable oscillations (Figures: 2.7.1, 
2.7.2). One observes that risk, r = rv/ri, is the risk perception of vaccination relative to infection, 
it follows that decreasing the relative risk is equivalent to increasing the risk of infection relative 
to vaccination. Thus, this implies that high risk perception of infection leads to an increase in 
vaccination. In other words, when the population takes the virus seriously, there is decreased 
epidemiological severity. Additionally, intermediate risk leads to high frequency infection and 
supports the notion that vaccination hesitancy promotes the propagation of disease [15, 31]. 
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Figure 2.7.1: A – B: Time series evolution of the state variables and effective reproductive 
number respectively. C – D: Phase portraits for the respective time series in column 1. E – F: 
Fixed points with respect to r. blue and red lines represent stable and unstable fixed points 
respectively. BP’s represent branching point bifurcations where the fixed point has an identical 
zero eigenvalue. NS’s represent neutral saddle equilibrium; a saddle node with an identical zero 
normal form coefficient. H’s represent Andronov-Hopf bifurcations with a pair of purely 
imaginary eigenvalues. Initial conditions are set about a perturbation of the neutral saddle 




Figure 2.7.2: A – B: Time series evolution of the state variables and effective reproductive 
number respectively. C – D: Phase portraits for the respective time series in column 1. E – F: 
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Fixed points with respect to r, µ. Solid and dotted lines represent stable and unstable periodic 
orbits respectively. Blue and red curves correspond to periodic orbit and stable focus boundaries 
respectively. CP’s represent cusp bifurcations corresponding to a saddle node bifurcation with 
zero normal form coefficient. NS’s represent neutral saddle equilibrium; a saddle node with an 
identical zero normal form coefficient. BT’s represent Bogdanov-Takens correspond to a fixed 
point with zero eigenvalue with multiplicity two. GH’s represent generalized Hopf bifurcations 
corresponding to the intersection between stable and unstable periodic orbit. Initial conditions 
are set about a perturbation of the Bogdanov-Takens bifurcation using algorithm 2.2.3. The 
system displays unstable periodic orbits at high values of r and low values of µ. 
 
2.8 High Vaccination Efficacy Impedes Infection 
Previous studies have suggested that willingness to vaccinate is highly coordinated with 
public perception of risk associated to vaccination [9, 19, 35, 36]. That is, high risk perception of 
vaccination decreases the likelihood of the population taking the vaccine and impedes the 
achievement of herd immunity. Since intermediate values of risk play a significant barrier to the 
achievement of herd immunity [30], we choose to evaluate the role of vaccination efficacy along 
the unstable branch at the emergence of the sub-critical Andronov-Hopf bifurcation at r = 1.6353 
in Figure 2.7.1. We observe that larger vaccine efficacies only reduce the severity (amplitude of 
infection) and is limited in reducing the endemic state of the endemic (Figure 2.8.1). This is a 
limitation of the model, which considers the emergence of breakthrough infection, i.e., 
vaccination leakage, phenomenologically corresponding to the emergence of new strands of 
COVID-19 in the long run (Section 3). 
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Figure 2.8.1: A – B: Time series evolution of the state variables and effective reproductive 
number respectively. C – D: Phase portraits for the respective time series in column 1. E – F: 
Fixed points with respect to r, µ. Blue and red curves correspond to periodic orbit and stable 
focus boundaries respectively. NS’s represent neutral saddle equilibrium; a saddle node with an 
identical zero normal form coefficient. BT’s represent Bogdanov-Takens correspond to a fixed 
point with zero eigenvalue with multiplicity two.  BP6’s represents branching point bifurcations. 
Initial conditions are set about a perturbation of the Bogdanov-Takens bifurcation using 
algorithm 2.2.3. The system displays unstable periodic orbits at high values of r and low values 
of µ. 
 
2.9 Education Reduces Infection 
Some studies suggest that the spread of misinformation precedes the infection [17], we 
consider the case where people change their behavior in response to infection. For µ ∈ (0.06, 
0.1), we observe mixed oscillations along the unstable branch (Figures: 2.6.1, 2.6.2, 2.6.3). To 
observe how the promotion of good information, which corresponds to the increase in the rate at 
which people change behavior in response to infection, we start from the sub-critical Andronov-
Hopf bifurcation at µ = 0.10 and vary the rate of education ϵ. We observe that increasing the 
good information decreases the amplitude of infection yet, increases the mean frequency of 
infection suggesting that reducing the spread of coronoa-misinformation is necessary to reduce 
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the onset of limit cycles and stop the infection (Figure 2.6.3). We observe that promoting the 
education promotes the vaccination and decreases infection, which is obtained for high risk and 
low risk respectively (Figures: 2.9.1, 2.9.2). Depending on the risk, intermediate education leads 
to high frequency stable oscillations (Figure 2.9.1) or complex oscillations emerging from an 
unstable branching point (Figure 2.9.2). The effects of the transmission of good information can 
be understood by observing Figure 2.9.3; where high risk corresponds to unstable oscillations 
and low risk corresponds to stable periodic oscillation. From a public health perspective, 
decreasing the risk perception of the vaccination while promoting education drives the system to 
disease free equilibrium (Figure 2.9.3: A, C).  
 
Figure 2.9.1: Time series evolution of the state variables and effective reproductive 
number respectively. C – D: Phase portraits for the respective time series in column 1. E – F: 
Fixed points with respect to ϵ. The blue and red lines represent stable and unstable fixed points 
respectively. BP’s represent branching point bifurcations where the fixed point has an identical 
zero eigenvalue. NS’s represent neutral saddle equilibrium; a saddle node with an identical zero 
normal form coefficient. H’s represent Andronov-Hopf bifurcations with a pair of purely 
imaginary eigenvalues.  LP’s represents limit point bifurcations where the fixed point has an 
identical zero eigenvalue. Initial conditions are set about a perturbation of the Andronov-Hopf 
bifurcation using algorithm 2.2.3.  
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Figure 2.9.2: A – B: Time series evolution of the state variables and effective reproductive 
number respectively. C – D: Phase portraits for the respective time series in column 1. E – F: 
Fixed points with respect to ϵ. blue and red lines represent stable and unstable fixed points 
respectively. BP’s represent branching point bifurcations where the fixed point has an identical 
zero eigenvalue. NS’s represent neutral saddle equilibrium; a saddle node with an identical zero 
normal form coefficient. H’s represent Andronov-Hopf bifurcations with a pair of purely 
imaginary eigenvalues. Initial conditions are set about a perturbation of the Andronov-Hopf 
bifurcation using algorithm 2.2.3. 
 
 
Figure 2.9.3: A – B: Time series evolution of the state variables and effective reproductive 
number respectively. C – D: Phase portraits for the respective time series in column 1. E – F: 
Fixed points with respect to r, ϵ. Blue and red curves correspond to periodic orbit and stable 
focus boundaries respectively. DH’s represent Double Hopf bifurcations corresponding to two 
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distinct pairs of purely imaginary eigenvalues. GH’s represent Generalized Hopf bifurcations 
corresponding to the transition between stable and unstable periodic orbit. BT’s represent 
Bogdanov-Takens correspond to a fixed point with zero eigenvalue with multiplicity two.  Initial 
conditions are set about a perturbation of the Double Hopf bifurcation using algorithm 2.2.3. 
The system displays unstable periodic orbits for a narrow region of high r. 
 
3 CONCLUSIONS 
The COVID-19 pandemic has placed an unprecedented tax on the public economy and 
health on nations worldwide. This global pandemic is unique as it is the first pandemic to occur 
in the digital age. The overabundance of bad information related to the coronavirus and vaccine 
has been recognized as a major hurdle in the combat against the pandemic, acting as a brake on 
intervention strategies in reducing the spread of infection [3, 41, 42]. An increasing amount of 
evidence have shown that Covid-19 vaccines not only protect against severe symptoms and 
deaths due to infection, but are effective in reducing overall infection [8, 10, 34], even against 
the more infectious Delta variant. One major barrier to the increase in vaccine uptake proponents 
of public health mitigation is vaccine hesitancy [28, 31]. As a new wave of COVID-19 caused by 
the Delta variant races across the world, mentions of some phrases prone to vaccine 
misinformation in July jumped as much as five times the June rate, according to Zignal Labs, 
which tracks mentions on social media, on cable television and in print and online outlets. Some 
of the most prevalent falsehoods are that vaccines don’t work (up 437 percent), that they contain 
microchips (up 156 percent), that people should rely on their “natural immunity” instead of 
getting vaccinated (up 111 percent) and that the vaccines cause miscarriages (up 75 percent).” 
New York Times reported on August 10, 2021 [1]. To combat the controversial issues regarding 
COVID-19 vaccination and achievement of herd immunity, we evaluate the concomitant spread 
of infection and information in the context of emergence of new strands by including a 
vaccination leakage compartment. At the beginning stages of a pandemic, the infection begins to 
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take off and people do not take the appropriate precautionary measures to reduce the infection. 
Since the spread of corona-misinformation precedes the onset of infection, we model the disease 
infection driven by those carrying bad information [17]. We choose to evaluate the role of 
vaccination in reducing the spread of infection driven by those with bad information. Since 
public trust and perception of vaccination significantly contribute to the likelihood of vaccination 
uptake, we consider modeling the adoption of vaccination, which depends on risk perception of 
vaccination relative to infection [19, 35]. Using an evolutionary game theoretical framework to 
model the probability of vaccination uptake, we observe that high perception of risk leads to the 
emergence of stable limit cycles corresponding to a persistent state of infection (Figures: 2.7.1, 
2.7.2). Lastly, we observe that although good information reduces the severity of infection, 
reduction in the spread of bad information is sufficient to inhibit the recurrence and severity of 
infection (Figures: 2.6.1, 2.6.2, 2.6.3). Since our model considers the spread of corona-
misinformation to require physical interaction between good and bad information domains, 
reducing the spread of bad information delays the recurrence of infection is obtained by limiting 
the interaction between good and bad information domains and not by reducing the abundance of 
information. Additionally, our model fails to discriminate between disinformation and 
misinformation, the key difference focusing on the malicious intent of the latter. 
Furthermore, we note that our model considers the spread of information which requires physical 
contact between good and bad domain carriers and is independent of the quantity of information 
exchange [41]. We consider the probability of vaccination uptake, which is derived using 
classical evolutionary game theory replicator equations [20]. Lastly, we consider an SIS model 
with temporary immunity of vaccination due to the potential for the emergence of new COVID-
19 variants, which act as a brake on the achievement of herd immunity and supports the 
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recurrence of future infection [5]. We note that other frameworks that model the impact of 
information on infection consider SEIR type disease domain models [39, 41]. Since the 
vaccination compartment has a leakage and the vaccinated become re-infected, then the 
achievement of herd immunity cannot be obtained by increasing the fraction of the population to 
become vaccinated. Hence, vaccination only acts as a temporal delay on the infection spread 
rather than decrease on long term epidemiological severity. This differs from mathematical 
models that considers vaccinated individuals to return to the susceptible compartment [6].  
3.1 Future Directions 
 Alternative approaches to our model may consider using a SEIR with a vaccination 
compartment focused on a specific strand or an SIR model in the disease domain. Our model is 
catered to the potential emergence of new strands of COVID-19 in the long run. We may also 
alter the risk function to include information in the payoff calculation Our results suggest that 
even at vaccination efficacy as high as 90%, reducing the spread of bad information is necessary 
to stop the spread of infection; supporting public health mitigation strategies that focus on 
information exchange. Additionally, our model is limited in a compartmental framework, which 
assumes equal probability of transmission throughout the population. The compartmental model 
is not the most representative spread of information, since most digital and social networks admit 
super spreaders with higher levels of spread. Our model may be extrapolated onto a bipartite 
network in which the information domain takes the form of a social network, and the disease 
domain takes the form of scale free network. Alternatively, one may consider modeling the 
transmission between stratified aged populations in the disease domain. It would be interesting to 
see how the results depend on the connectivity of the hubs. Like Ye’s framework, one may 
consider the bipartite network in lieu of the stratified SIS model [41]. Although the results of the 
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co-evolution of pandemic and infodemic are limited to the context of emerging strands of 
COVID-19, the modelling of information exchange may be extrapolated to the exchanging of 
ideas. The exchanging of ideas requires close communication between sender and receiver and 
this interaction may be assumed to be non-linear since the absence of sender or receiver may lead 
to a lack of idea exchange. As thoughts, which are often driven by information received and 
interpreted, and actions are driven by initiative. The stable oscillations in the co-evolution model 
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